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Abstract 
 
Many innovative knowledge management systems failed to reach its full potential not only 
because of technical problems and organizational barriers but also because social actors are 
not motivated to share in the first place. Although current studies have identified a variety of 
motivational factors which may inhibit knowledge sharing, we still know relatively little about 
the implicit reasons, or hidden agendas, underlying these factors. This field-based study 
investigates an unsuccessful adoption of a knowledge-sharing system which is employed to 
facilitating supply chain operations across two locations – Taiwan and China. It highlights 
the dilemma of knowledge-sharing encountered by engineers based in the two organizations. 
This analysis also illustrates how explicit incentive mechanisms may only induce insignificant 
improvement but reinforce counterproductive collaborative behavior. This research analyzes 
such knowledge-sharing dilemmas through organizational members’ implicit concerns in, and 
fears of, exchanging knowledge with their colleagues. The findings offer important 
implications for promoting knowledge sharing within engineer communities and examine the 
challenges of knowledge-management system adoption in Asian context. 
 
Keywords: Knowledge sharing, motivation, incentive mechanisms, knowledge-management 
system, counterproductive collaborative behavior 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Increasingly, a company’s competitive advantage lies in the combination of physical, 
organizational and intellectual assets (Barney 1991). This train of thought has encouraged 
contemporary enterprises to embrace organizational knowledge as a valuable and inimitable 
asset which a source of sustained competitive advantage (Lado and Wilson 1994; Spender 
1996; Tsoukas 1996). As a result, knowledge-management systems such as virtual forum, 
knowledge repertoire, and expert systems, are developed to help employees to share their 
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ideas and best practices. Information systems have provided a more effective way to codify, 
acquire and share knowledge (Davenport and Prusak 1997). 
However, the identification and transfer of best practices through these innovative 
systems are seldom successful in real-life applications (Alavi and Leidner 2001; McDermott 
1999; O'Dell and Grayson 1998). Research in this area has established that external conditions 
and systems features are two main causes for the unproductive adoption of these knowledge-
based innovations. Issues such as lack of motivation mechanism (Huber 2001), inappropriate 
conversion of knowledge (Nonaka 1994), and ineffective knowledge reuse (Markus 2001) are 
identified to explain the main challenges for the use of knowledge management systems.  
Our study focuses on the issue of incentive and motivation. The lack of motivation will 
discourage users’ intention to adopt knowledge-management system and engage in 
knowledge-share in the first place, even before they can see the actual benefit of this 
innovation (Ba, Stallaert and Winston, 2001). There are generally two sources of 
disincentives. The first is concerned with users’ evaluation of systems in terms of its 
relevance, usefulness, and ease of use. The second is related to the social aspect of resistance, 
such as lack of economic incentive to share (particularly from the giver side), lack of 
psychological ownership (to involve and be empowered in knowledge-sharing), and lack of 
absorptive capacity (especially from the receiver side). 
The present studies have suggested different types of incentive mechanism to motivate 
users. For example, a voting mechanism can be offered to allow users to vote on a set of 
alternatives (Gavish and Gerdes 1997). Such a mechanism can encourage users’ actively 
involvement. A company could also provide monetary incentives so that users are willing to 
spend time to contribute their know-how and apply systems to engage learning. In this way, 
users may be willing to give away certain knowledge if the return is justifiable. Alternatively, 
a reputation mechanism can be established so as to acknowledge the knowledge givers’ 
sharing behavior. Although reputation is an intangible asset, one’s reputation could 
accumulate social capitals for future gains such as career promotion. From a social exchange 
perspective, organizations may also cultivate a knowledge-sharing culture to promote 
goodwill sharing – employees share knowledge because of their altruism preferences 
(Constant et al. 1994). 
However, less-explored subject of motivation research in this area is to look at the 
“hidden agenda”, or implicit reasons, for not sharing knowledge. The motivation factors may 
be more sophisticated than they appear to knowledge users (for both the giver and recipient). 
In certain situations, knowledge givers may want to share with the recipients but unwilling to 
do so because they fear the implicit consequence that may endanger their personal gains. For 
instance, by sharing knowledge as a public good, social actors might encounter free-riders and 
people who abuse such goodwill by claiming the ownership of knowledge shared in the 
repertoire (Cabrera and Cabrera 2002). Under this circumstance, to avoid being labeled as bad 
citizens in an organization, knowledge users may choose to remain silent and engage in 
counterproductive activities. Such hidden agendas nevertheless are not to be discussed openly 
and therefore motivation mechanism designed to promote knowledge-sharing may only 
produce marginal impact on social actors. 
In this study, we attempt to articulate examine motivation issues in knowledge sharing 
and unveil the hidden intention that prevent people to share – these concerns are hidden not 
because of the knowledge users’ inability to share but because of the unwillingness to share. 
This paper is structured in the following way. The next section explores the theoretical basis 
of knowledge sharing motivation within organizations. The third section reports research 
methods employed by this field-based study. The fourth section presents research findings 
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with regards to five hidden agendas. Lastly, we suggest theoretical and practical implications 
of this study with regard to knowledge-sharing challenges. 
 
2. Motivations for Knowledge-sharing 
Asking people to share what they know can be difficult. The first challenge is to get 
people motivated. Advance information systems such as knowledge database and online 
discussion forum, such as Eureka employed by Xerox (ref here) and ShareNet used by 
Siemens (Voelpel and Han 2005), are often used to facilitate knowledge acquisition and 
dissemination. However, before a company embarks on any form of knowledge sharing via 
innovative technologies, they must ensure that organizational members are motivated to share. 
The issue of people’s motivation therefore is the first and foremost impediment a company 
needs to deal with.  
Ideally, to promote effective knowledge-sharing, knowledge should be considered as a 
public good (Wasko and Faraj 2000). In this way, knowledge exchange is motivated by moral 
obligation, generalized reciprocity, and community interests rather than by narrow self-
interest. In reality, nonetheless, although most organizational members understand that 
sharing knowledge will benefit the company, people choose not to share what they know for 
many good reasons. Specifically, people hesitate to contribute because of fear of criticism, or 
of misleading the community members. These reasons are related to technology, knowledge, 
and organization (Ardichvili et al. 2003; Empson 2001; Kalling 2003). 
With regards to technology, people will not be motivated to share knowledge if the 
systems that support knowledge storage and transmission are unreliable (von Krogh et al. 
2000). The lack of robust knowledge-management infrastructure will pose serious problems. 
Sufficient training is also required as to assist employees share knowledge through applying 
the knowledge-management systems (Zhang et al. 2005). 
In terms of knowledge, the transfer of tacit knowledge is often problematic because such 
knowledge is situated and context dependent (Brown and Duguid 1991). The conversion of 
such tacit knowledge into explicit format can be difficult and thus fail to motivate employees 
(Nonaka 1994). Knowledge givers will not be motivated to share if the receivers lack of 
absorptive capacity, or sufficient prior knowledge to acquire new source of knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Moreover, if a receiver never perform his duty and contributes 
to the knowledge repertoire, givers will eventually terminate their contributions to the 
community (Lam 1997).  
In the organization aspect, firms need to nurture a knowledge-sharing culture to 
encourage employees’ exchange of information (Amit and Schoemaker 1993). When people 
feel a sense of belonging in the community, they are more incline to share. Apart from 
nurturing a sharing culture, firms also need to build trust among different team members 
(Chowdhury 2005). Trust must be developed between every member in order to improve 
knowledge sharing throughout the organization. Employees who perceived knowledge as a 
means of achieving upward organizational mobility are less likely to share (Burgess 2005). 
In the lack of motivation to share knowledge, explicit incentive mechanisms can be often 
design to motivate knowledge users. These incentive mechanisms may include monetary 
rewards, job performance assessment, reputation mechanism, and social interaction 
enhancement (Kubo and Saka 2002; Markus 2001). For instance, rewards could be made 
partly contingent on knowledge sharing behaviors as in merit pay. Rewards based on 
collective performance are also effective in creating a climate of cooperation, ownership, and 
commitment among employees. Team-based incentives, such as profit-sharing, gain-sharing, 
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and employee stock options, are particularly instrumental in enhancing knowledge sharing 
company-wide (Bartol and Srivastava 2002).  
However, sharing knowledge within a community may prove to be more sophisticated 
than simply removing technology barriers – such as improving technology robustness – and 
organizational impediments – such as a lack of knowledge-sharing culture. But, in many 
instances, although people can be motivated by explicit incentive mechanisms and share what 
they know, many of them also may have other implicit concerns and hidden agendas. Such 
behaviors are best examined by considering “knowledge as constructed, disseminated, and 
legitimated through an ongoing process of interaction among individuals” (Empson 2001, pp. 
858). To fully understand why people are reluctant to share, we need to explore the implicit 
dimension and unveil the hidden agendas that concerns knowledge users. 
 
3. Research Method 
 
3.1 Case Selection 
This case was based on an US company’s Asia headquarters based in Singapore, known as 
SPEED Technologies (all company names shown here are disguised as requested). SPEED 
needed to streamline its supply chain, and one key task was to facilitate effective sharing of 
product design and manufacturing knowledge with its key suppliers. QUICKLY was one of 
SPEED’s strategic suppliers, which is a US $5 billion company based in Taiwan. The 
Optoelectronics Division of QUICKLY operates a manufacturing plant in Tianjin (a city 
nearby Beijing), China while the R&D group is based in Taipei, Taiwan.  
In QUICKLY, effective supply chain operations required the Product Development 
Team of the R&D Group in Taipei to share product and process related knowledge with the 
Manufacturing Team of the Tianjin plant. This involved the transfer of such knowledge from 
the Taipei R&D team to Tianjin production team. However, over time (during 2003-2004), 
the Tianjin production team were inept in absorbing and assimilating knowledge transferred 
from Taipei R&D team. This resulted in increased product quality problems at the Tianjin 
plant.  
In this situation, QUICKLY began to fall below SPEED’s expectations and felt 
increasingly helpless in handling many of the outstanding production disruptions and product 
quality issues. The Product Development Team often had to communicate with the Tianjin 
engineers and resolve these supply chain breakdowns from Taipei. Frequently, the Taipei 
engineers had to fly to Tianjin to resolve these issues personally. This created longer lead time 
for production, higher production costs, and escalating conflicts between the Taipei and 
Tianjin team. The price to pay for the poor knowledge transfer was tremendous, economically 
and socially. In Taipei, these supply chain disruptions imposed extra burden on the Product 
Development Team, resulting in fatigue and unnecessary distraction from their new product 
development tasks. In Tianjin, the Manufacturing Team also faced increasing yield loss at 
their production line due to the inability to master the process-related know-how. As a whole, 
poor knowledge sharing has resulted in increasing customer dissatisfaction, leading to 
diminishing sales and profits, and compounded by increased costs due to substantial yield loss 
at the production lines. The relationship is deteriorated between both teams, leading to further 
distrust. 
Both teams are made up of ethnic Chinese, coming from similar cultural background, 
sharing the same language, and often working closely to one another affectively. Both teams 
were entwined in a symbiotic relationship whereby there is a strong mutual dependence for 
each other in order to ensure the organization’s economic survival. Nonetheless, unwittingly 
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they preferred not to share and receive knowledge from each other. Gradually, two parties 
were more inclined to act destructively, allowing collective loss as a result. 
 
3.2 Method 
Our investigations focused on examining the dysfunctional adoptive behavior behind the 
current knowledge-sharing situation in the Optoelectronic Division of QUICKLY. We 
employed a qualitative approach for the purpose of “theory elaboration”, which aims to apply 
a theory to better analyze a social phenomenon and at the same time elaborate a theory 
through cases (Lee, Mitchell and Sablynski 1999, pp.164). Knowledge sharing is a dynamic 
and intricate interaction of people, technology and context. Different patterns of human 
behaviors would inevitably play a major role in shaping the dynamics of knowledge sharing 
and the use of technology. However, such natural behaviors are not easily observable and are 
limited when it is studied in a controlled laboratory-type of environment (e.g. Griffith and 
Northcraft 1996). Self-defense responses are especially acute in cases where the objective is 
to uncover factors behind certain flaws within the organization. Social actors may be reluctant 
to reveal the realistic causes for fear of job security or other hidden reasons. This situation is 
especially true in the Asian context where organizational members are generally less 
outspoken than their Western counterparts, and they generally place the interests of their 
community above other incentives. 
As such, our method of research would be conducted through observations of the 
employees at work and casual, open-ended one-on-one conversations in informal settings. We 
carefully selected a pool of targeted respondents from both teams to ensure a broad cross-
section of the age, work experience and income groups, so as to reduce biasness (see Table 1). 
We targeted three respondents from the Taipei Product Development Team who were 
arranged to fly to Tianjin plant in order to collaborate on the introduction of a new product. In 
addition, we also targeted at five employees from Tianjin who are the key members of the 
Manufacturing Team. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
For two weeks during mid-April 2005, one researcher was working very closely with 
both Manufacturing and Product Development Teams on the introduction of a new 
optoelectronic product designed for SPEED. Based on the trust built upon the friendship and 
close working relationship over the years, we were able to get the respondents to share their 
thoughts and feedback on the current knowledge-sharing situation. In an ongoing basis, from 
June 2005 to February 2006, we traced these respondents and extended our interviews with 
engineers from both sides in order to understand how unproductive adoptive behaviors had 
been developed and affected the adoption of knowledge management systems. 
The research involved face-to-face informal discussions with both the Taiwanese and 
PRC employees of QUICKLY. Such discussions are mostly integrated into the context of 
finding solutions to resolve technical issues in the shortest possible time, and include 
questions such as: How may knowledge sharing benefit your practices in supply chain 
operations? What do you perceive the current level of knowledge sharing between you and 
your Taiwanese/PRC (People of Republic of China) counterpart? Are you in any way 
motivated to share your knowledge with the Taiwanese/PRC engineers, given that such 
knowledge would immensely help both sides, and why not? What have prohibited you to 
share knowledge with your Taiwanese/PRC counterparts? What are the current motivation 
mechanisms? How well do the present motivation mechanisms, such as monetary rewards, 
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encourage you and your colleagues to share knowledge? What do you think of the present 
online knowledge management system? How does it facilitate knowledge sharing between 
you and your Taiwanese/PRC counterparts? What are your impressions of your 
Taiwanese/PRC counterparts on a personal level and at the working level? 
We were also aware that many engineers would not be comfortable to reveal their true 
feeling in the formal personal interviews. Additionally we also conduct onsite observations 
and engage in informal interactions with the Taiwanese and the PRC employees. To obtain 
more authentic data, one of the researchers is working with both side’s engineers in handling 
supply chain activities. This helped us gain in-depth information and obtain engineers’ honest 
feedback. We avoided conducting formal/structural interviews or questionnaires in order not 
to offend the employees in the sensitive working context, especially in such a cultural setting 
employees are more reserved and less vocal. 
 
4. Research Findings 
 
4.1 Sharing Knowledge in Supply Chain  
In Taipei, the Product Development Team consisted of four senior engineers, led by a 
senior manager. The team had clocked up years of experience in developing new 
optoelectronic products for SPEED Technologies. SPEED’s R&D engineers would translate 
customer requirements into technical specifications of the new product and send these 
specifications to the Product Development Team in QUICKLY based in Taipei. Based on 
principles of manufacturability, the Product Development engineers would design products in 
accordance with the technical specifications and production capability. Subsequently, the 
Product Development engineers could transfer the product design from the Design Phase to 
the Mass Production Phase by working closely with production engineers from the 
Manufacturing Team based in Tianjin. QUICKLY used a MBO (Management By Objectives) 
system to evaluate employee performance.  
For the Product Development Team, the most critical MBO target was “project cycle 
time”, which measures the time taken from the receipt of new technical specifications, the 
completion of design, to the handover to the Manufacturing Team prior to the start of the 
Mass Production Phase. Typically the target cycle time would be three months. But with 
increased pressure on shortening the time-to-market for SPEED’s products, the target had 
been reduced further to two months since mid-2004. Hence, effective knowledge transfer 
became the most important goal for the Product Development Teams. Yet to members of this 
team, other hidden personal agendas often overrode this goal. Our investigations indicated 
knowledge sharing challenges in three distinct contexts: economic, social and organizational. 
The senior executives at the Taiwanese headquarters of QUICKLY recognized the 
importance of a knowledge management system.  They committed significant resources 
towards deploying a robust technology platform to allow engineers to contribute information 
and exchange knowledge on supply chain operations. This system was first set up way back in 
2002 and is hosted within the company’s central intranet system which is maintained by a 
group of dedicated IT staff.  The knowledge management system currently comprises of an 
online database, which stores technical documentations such as product specifications, testing 
specifications, etc and is protected by a simple password security system. In addition, there 
are robust tools within the knowledge management system which allows users to upload, 
search and retrieve existing knowledge, hence enabling knowledge reuse rather than 
regeneration of knowledge (reinventing the wheel). In 2004, system access was also extended 
to SPEED’s engineers to facilitate transfer of knowledge between the two companies. In 
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short, QUICKLY has an enabling infrastructure that promotes sharing and collaboration of 
corporate knowledge and intellectual assets across various departments and regions, and even 
between different companies. The senior management of QUICKLY has also explicitly 
encouraged their employees to fully utilize the benefits of this knowledge management 
system, by offering various incentives which will be explored later in this paper. 
 
4.2 Knowledge Sharing Problems and the Limit of Incentive Mechanisms 
The most frequent encountered issue is organizational members’ rationalization of their 
self-interests. An individual will assess the economic value of his personally held expertise 
and compare the reward of keeping such knowledge to oneself versus the cost of sharing the 
knowledge. The economic value of such knowledge is also dependent on the relevance of the 
knowledge to business requirements and the organizational duties of the individual. 
For QUICKLY’s product design engineers, the knowledge on the semiconductor 
package designs was critical to ensure manufacturability (the new product design can be 
manufactured) to be transferred to the Mass Production Phase. By frequently traveling to 
Tianjin and participating in the transition process, product design engineers accumulated 
important technical know-how. Nonetheless, there is no perceived benefit to motivate the 
product development engineers to share their valuable expertise while they were in constantly 
fears of being made redundant. One senior engineer who has 15 years of working experience 
in semiconductor packaging design noted:  
You know, I have accumulated all these years of experience in semiconductor 
packaging, bit by bit, step by step, and it has brought me to my present position 
within the company. I personally feel privileged to enjoy the perks that came 
along with this position and the pay allows my family to live comfortably in 
Taipei. I know my job requires me to share knowledge with the Tianjin engineers, 
but do you think it would be wise of me to share everything with them?  
 
Another key concern was the production engineers’ fears that QUICKLY might in the 
long run close Taiwan offices and move the supply offshore to China. By keeping the R&D 
expertise in house and by not sharing fully to their Chinese colleagues, the product 
development engineers perceived that an effective way to protect their job security by 
withholding critical knowledge assets. Another engineers registered a typical concern: 
Already the management has started to shift important functions and jobs to 
China due to the lower cost of labor there. Now, it is manufacturing; very soon, it 
will be product development. Semiconductor business is a very tough business, 
with low profit margins. So naturally jobs will gravitate towards lower cost 
centers, right?  
 
For the product design engineers, a hidden agenda was to leverage on their product and 
process related knowledge to make them indispensable in the company. As a whole, 
collectively the design engineers hoped to show that R&D center in Taipei plays a strategic 
position by holding imitable knowledge assets. Moreover, the design engineers would need 
their expertise for negotiation of remuneration, as QUICKLY did not have an effective 
mechanism for engineers’ job promotion and career planning. A senior engineer further 
commented: 
You see, it is easy to say that I should always think of the company’s interests 
before self-interests, but in the real world, I have to think of personal survival 
first. My technical knowledge is my prized asset, it gives me competitive edge 
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over the rest and most importantly, it ensures my monthly pay cheques. 
Sometime, it also helps me to bargain for pay raise. Why should I let go of such 
asset so easily? It will be suicidal to do that. Besides, I’m not the only one who 
thinks that way, if you look around, everyone in the team is also trying to protect 
his own advantage too…also, there is no incentive to share, so as long as I do my 
job well by transferring the product to the mass production phase, whatever 
happens after that is the responsibility of the manufacturing team. 
 
Limit of Economic Incentives: QUICKLY’s solution to increase users’ incentive was to 
enhance the perceived benefits by linking economic incentives to the outcome of knowledge 
sharing. The company attempted to offer monetary rewards based on an individual’s level of 
participation in knowledge sharing. However, the economic rewards only encouraged limited 
knowledge sharing efforts in QUICKLY’s business context. Most engineers shown 
indifference towards the rewards. A Product Development manager quipped: 
[Monetary rewards] are not practical in our business environment. Our business is 
focused on offering the lowest costs for our customers; so we operate at a razor-
thin margin. We simply could not afford substantial monetary rewards for 
knowledge sharing. Besides, if the company is to undergo a downturn and 
therefore unable to pay the rewards, will this result in complete withholding of 
knowledge? In addition, no monetary rewards can replace a steady stream of 
monthly income. So I rather keep my job than having monetary rewards. 
 
The Limit of Job Performance Assessment: Although the company wanted to provide 
more incentives by linking job performance to the contribution of knowledge, this measure 
ultimately cause backfire in QUICKLY. Engineers were wary of sharing ideas through verbal 
means or through actions, because they would fear that the recipients may claim the idea 
ownership. By measuring job performance through knowledge production in fact might incur 
more hidden concerns for knowledge sharing. Such initiatives actually could discourage 
knowledge sharing and accentuate the fear of free-riders. As a senior engineer in Taipei put it: 
If they [the management] measure our job performance through our contribution 
to online documentations [as a form of knowledge sharing], then I better be wary 
and not reveal too much of what I know, when I am in Tianjin teaching the 
manufacturing team. I would be concerned about what I taught or demonstrated, 
as someone else might steal the idea. I prefer to document my knowledge first; 
but I simply could not afford the time for documentation. 
 
The Limit of Reputation Mechanism: The company also employed social recognition 
tactics in order to motivate knowledge sharing engineers. For example, in order to 
acknowledge the production of knowledge, the contributors’ names were listed in the online 
documentations stored in the knowledge repertoire. This was to provide a reputation 
mechanism to promote knowledge sharing as people who shared in the repertoire would duly 
receive social recognition. However, this was culturally not preferable because many 
engineers (ethnic Chinese) would be afraid being labeled as a ‘show-off’ person – which is 
considered not a gentlemanly behavior. The social cost of being labeled a ‘show-off’ person 
far outweighed that of social recognition. To share knowledge, the engineers would not 
receive social cognition but only community discrimination.  
The Limit of Social Interaction: However, the company perceived it as a lack of 
departmental communication. To foster mutual trust, the company launched team-building 
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activities, such as off-site adventure games, communication training, and consultation, in 
order to improve the hard feeling between two teams. However, such team-building activities 
in fact caused more indignant responses. One quality assurance engineer from the 
manufacturing team summed it up: 
When we took part in team-building activities, we did learn a lot about our team-
mates from Taipei. We learned to work together during the activities and trust 
each other. But once these activities were over, we returned back to reality. In 
fact, I even felt that having such activities would lead to un-realistic expectations 
of the other party and when such expectations are not met in real life, it can be 
greatly disappointing and lead to further deterioration of trust. 
 
The above analyses explain the main knowledge sharing problems faced by QUICKLY 
and report five main incentive mechanisms employed by the company. In this case, the 
company must share knowledge between its product development and production teams in 
order to maintain the integrity of supply chain operations. In good faith, employees wanted to 
share what they know so that the company as a whole could survive in the competitive 
environment. But the incentive schemes suggested by the company did not seem to work well 
for the employees, because what is at stake is more than economic gains and self-interest. Our 
ethnographic study highlighted four hidden agendas which potentially prohibit knowledge 
sharing among engineers. These are implicit disincentives that discourage knowledge sharing 
between knowledge givers and receivers. Although current theories and practices have 
suggested explicit methods to alleviate these disincentives, the resolution of these hidden 
agendas can be more sophisticated than they appear to be. 
 
4.3 Hidden Agenda #1: Defending Free-Riders  
In a sense, sharing such knowledge to upgrade Chinese colleagues in Tianjin also 
provided a disservice to the company as a whole as perceived by the design engineers. There 
were many multinational corporations in the Wuqing Development Area and an engineer 
could easily earn 50% to 100% more than his current salary by acquiring such design-to-
manufacturing knowledge. Job-hopping was not uncommon in China. As intellectual property 
laws in China were not effectively reinforced, sharing knowledge with the Chinese employees 
would mean revealing proprietary knowledge to QUICKLY’s competitors. For this reason, 
Taiwanese engineers preferred not to transfer the critical knowledge to the Chinese colleagues 
but often chose to fly to Tianjin personally in order to resolve the manufacturing issues. A 
senior design engineer cited:  
Honestly speaking, it is a good idea to share; in fact, we faced so much pressure 
from our management and customer [SPEED] to resolve the technical issues and 
improve the yield. I know we should train the Tianjin engineers to handle these 
issues by sharing the knowledge openly. But, a theory is as good as a theory; in an 
ideal world, everybody should share knowledge openly. In the practical world 
where we live in, we have to be aware of the unknown traps. My colleagues in 
Tianjin often complained about the high turnover rates in their departments. An 
engineer could come in and work with us for a few months; and after receiving 
intensive training in different aspects of technical areas and at times involving in 
proprietary knowledge transfer, he moves on to a rival company across the street.  
 
There was also a sentiment for not wanting to share valuable knowledge with 
unappreciative partners. For the design engineers in Taipei, what they are about to share was 
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hard-earned knowledge. There was a hard feeling for giving away such knowledge too easily 
to the Chinese colleagues who are perceived by Taiwanese engineers as opportunistic. A 
senior design engineer expressed such feeling:  
In Taipei, we went through a lot of experimenting and hardships to accumulate 
the technical know-how. Now the Tianjin engineers, with so little experience but 
arrogant attitude and lofty ambitions, expect us to spoon-feed them with 
information and knowledge. This is certainly not morally right. There is a Chinese 
saying that one should go through hardships and personal experience in order to 
attain what he desires. Why should I be giving away hard-earned knowledge so 
easily, especially when my team and I still need to take time to sort out all the 
documents and place them on the intranet? Sorry, but we got better things to do. 
 
Furthermore, most Chinese engineers still did not have fostered the concept of 
intellectual ownership. It was very common for them to claim credits in the hope for career 
advancement. Such an act was acceptable in the Tianjin office because no one would really 
take it too serious – in there, when everyone claimed the credit, the credit belongs to no one. 
However, this behavior was considered opportunistic and offensive from Taiwanese 
engineers’ viewpoint, as one noted:  
These opportunistic [Chinese] engineers would claim credits for things which 
they do not actually achieve. If you ask me about sharing with them some 
important tips, they may come around and claim these credits for themselves. 
 
Under such sentiment, the Chinese colleagues in Tianjin were perceived as free-riders by 
their Taiwanese partners. There was a problem of knowledge asymmetry. It seemed that 
knowledge is predominantly contributed by the Taiwanese engineers whereas the Chinese 
engineers seem to act merely as a receiver. This discouraged knowledge sharing from the 
giver side. Nevertheless, such an attitude also in turn discouraged the Chinese engineers to 
sharing what they know in the fear of being perceived as inferior. A production engineer in 
Tianjin suggested:  
The Product Development team has a richer pool of knowledge compared to our 
team. I really doubt that I am able to contribute any significant knowledge to 
them. They might look down at me and on my contributions. 
 
4.4 Hidden Agenda #2: Avoiding Knowledge Liability  
The design engineers also worried about become liable to their contribution of 
knowledge. In one illustrative instance, a senior engineer from the Product Development 
Team was asked to share with his Chinese production engineers on the maintenance of tester 
machine. The production engineer followed his advice and instruction but only caused an 
irreparable damage to a critical component of the tester. The machine was breakdown for 
several days which incurred expensive overhaul cost, not to mention the cost attached to the 
supply chain interruption. The design engineer requested an investigation to trace the root 
causes of the machine damage.  
Consequently, the manufacturing team engineers escalated this issue to the top 
management, and placed blames on the Taiwanese engineer for giving wrong advices. The top 
management later found out that it was the Chinese engineer who had misinterpreted the 
advice. When the Chinese engineer found something was amiss, he did not seek further 
clarifications but engaged in personal experiment with the machine, thereby aggravating the 
damage. This episode had worried many Taiwanese engineers and as a result they lose a great 
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deal of confidence in sharing knowledge with the untrustworthy Chinese engineers. The 
victimized engineer expressed with sorrow:  
This event left me with a permanent ‘scar’; I’m now very wary about sharing my 
knowledge with others [the Chinese engineers]. Who knows, perhaps the next 
time something similar will happen; and not only I will lose my ‘face’ but also my 
job too. It is just not worth the effort [of sharing my knowledge with them]. 
 
4.5 Hidden Agenda #3: Lacking Absorptive Capacity  
Effective knowledge sharing requires the recipient side to equip with sufficient 
absorptive capacity to acquire knowledge from the giver. The recipient’s absorptive capacity 
consists of prior knowledge of the subject, enough experience on work practices, and both 
sides had interpreted knowledge exchange from their frame-of-reference and prior work 
practices. One senior engineer from the Product Development Team recounted his experience: 
After working with them [the Manufacturing Team in Tianjin] for the past three 
years, I realized that that they have many bad working habits, especially the 
veteran workers. The less-experienced ones appear to be OK; but after more 
interactions with the veteran workers, the new comers had also acquired these bad 
habits. What [are the] bad habits? Plenty of them, like they always seeking the 
short-cut, taking the company’s stationeries home…but what irked me most was 
that some of them “chi-da-guo-fan” [literally, share food from the same pot].  
 
As a result, most Taiwanese engineers tended to generalize the Chinese employees as 
incapable learners to absorb knowledge transferred. A Product Development manager 
observed that even though several Chinese engineers tried extremely hard to impress him, 
they however were lacking a systematic framework to organize their tasks. The manager 
explained that such prejudices come from a valid concern, as he noted:  
I did try to impart our technical knowledge [from Taipei] to the Chinese 
counterparts so that our engineers could travel less to Tianjin. However, most of 
them [the Chinese engineers] just could not absorb the knowledge well enough to 
transfer the knowledge to actual production works. They might be good at 
following your instructions as long as you write them clearly on piece of paper, 
step by step. But if you ask them to re-apply the knowledge, it seems that there is 
a mental block preventing them to do so. I am not sure if this is due to their lack 
of confidence or just pure lack of capability to absorb. 
 
The Manufacturing Team had also hard feeling toward the Taiwanese engineers. The 
Chinese engineers perceived that the Taiwanese partners were arrogant and at times share 
knowledge with little “hand-on” relevance. Since the Taiwanese engineers were not physical 
on the production line, what they share with the production engineers could be perceived as 
impractical which does not reflect the problem in situ. As a production manager from the 
Tianjin team puts it,  
We are not too keen on receiving knowledge from the Taiwanese, especially on 
process-related issues. We will gladly accept their views on product-related issues 
since the design is from there. But with regards to process-related issues, we are 
here at the line 24 hours a day. They are far away in Taipei; so how are they able 
to understand how the process really works without being physically here? We 
feel that they could not understand the situation we are in. Maybe that’s why we 
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sometimes accept the knowledge from them as a form of courtesy; but in reality, 
our own practical knowledge is still more relevant. 
 
In addition, the Taiwanese engineers’ prejudice towards the Chinese engineers also 
created a self-fulfilling prophecy effect – “the Chinese engineers are incapable; so, do not 
even bother to teach them”. The self-fulfilling prophecy effect significantly altered the Taipei 
team’s attitude when engineers attempted to share their knowledge with the Tianjin team. As 
a result, the Taipei team often treated the Tianjin team with a sense of contempt, which 
greatly demoralized the Chinese engineers and discouraged the reception of knowledge from 
the Taipei team. As a senior production engineer recalled: 
Due to the nature of my work, I have to understand the product inside-out in order 
to prepare for mass production. So I have to interact with the Taiwanese 
frequently. I am thorough in my work and always try hard to understand 
everything as detail as possible. However, when I raised questions about the 
knowledge they offer, they oftentimes ignore my questions. It’s like as if they 
expect me to just execute the instructions or follow the advice with no questions 
asked. It would be so much nicer if they are able to treat me with respect. 
 
Perceived that the Taiwanese partners were not paying due respect to them, the Chinese 
engineers also became reluctant to request help from the Taipei office. On the Taipei side, a 
desire to share could sometimes be tempered with the fear of being labeled by their Chinese 
colleagues as a person who is intended to show Taiwanese superiority. A product design 
engineer noted a typical response: 
Sharing knowledge will definitely help them [the Chinese engineers], that I’m 
pretty sure. But if they did not request for such knowledge, should I take the 
initiative to supply them with the knowledge? I don’t think that’s a good idea, 
they may think that I am trying to boast or show-off in front of them. I think it’s 
better that they ask me first. 
 
To encourage the knowledge sharing and enhance the recipients’ absorptive capacity, the 
company had also tried to empower the Tianjin team and delegate more responsibilities to the 
onsite engineers. However, the Chinese senior executives were also not very confident to 
delegate tasks fully to their engineers of the Manufacturing Team. A production supervisor of 
the Manufacturing Team explained: “We take our instructions from the Product Development 
team; whatever they say, we listen. We try not to ask too many questions; probably they know 
what is best for us.” It was widely perceived that the Product Development Team had the 
authority in deciding how things should be run in the production line. The lack of 
empowerment by the Manufacturing team in making independent critical decisions also 
reduces the Chinese engineers’ motivation to seek for in-depth knowledge. This reinforced the 
Chinese employees to rely on direct instructions. 
In the perception of most Chinese engineers, taking more responsibilities could result in 
a higher risk of losing their jobs. Consequently, most engineers still preferred to rely on direct 
instructions given by the Taiwanese engineers. This reinforces Taipei team’s belief that the 
Chinese engineers have lower absorptive capacity for knowledge acquisition and sharing 
strategic knowledge with them is therefore unnecessary. Moreover, empowering the Tianjin 
team would invariably escalate Taipei team’s fears in job security (e.g. they could be replaced 
by the Chinese colleagues if jobs are moved offshore). As a result, when the empowerment 
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initiative was launched by the top management, the Taipei engineers were even more cautious 
in sharing knowledge with the Tianjin team. 
 
4.6 Hidden Agenda #4: Engulfing Social Inequality 
Another disincentive to share also stemmed from the social segregation between 
Taiwanese expatriates and the local Chinese employees. The expatriates enjoyed a better 
condition of the accommodations. They had their meals in restaurant-like settings while their 
Tianjin colleagues were restricted to having their meals in a canteen. The senior executives 
from the Manufacturing Team were of no exception. A typical sentiment was expressed by a 
senior manager in Tianjin factory: “I have gotten used to it. But yes, it seems like they are 
trying to show us that they are a level above us.”  
One significant obstacle prevents successful knowledge sharing is the social segregation 
between Taiwanese and Chinese employees. An ideal solution would be remove the barriers 
and promote a fair work environment. The company had also considered this problem and 
emphasized that every employee should treated equally regardless of their nationalities. 
However, this idea was quickly rejected by infuriated Taiwanese engineers, because the social 
equality initiative was ‘unequal’ as it failed to acknowledge the important intellectual 
properties beheld by the Taipei engineers and personal sacrifice made for the company (by 
traveling to a less pleasant workplace). This slightly self-deluded view had prohibited the 
Taiwanese engineers to accept the ‘social equality’ initiative. A product development 
manager in Taipei replied: 
I don’t think any of us (Taiwanese) would agree to it. Traveling all the way from 
Taipei to a remote area like Wuqing is no joke. This is one of the perks we 
deserve here. Besides I do not think there is any serious implication due to such 
arrangement. We have been running this place for the past three years. If they [the 
management] do implement the initiative, I am not sure if I want to share with the 
manufacturing people anymore.  
 
5. Implications and Conclusion 
Prior studies have acknowledged that knowledge sharing may be discouraged by explicit 
motivational factors. In this study, “hidden agendas,” however, were found to be prevalent in 
disenabling knowledge sharing. There is a need for an analysis for practices in situ in order to 
better understand the nature of such hidden agendas and their implication on knowledge 
sharing. If we are insensitive to these hidden frames of references, we may encounter 
unsuccessful knowledge sharing even in the presence of a well-designed enabling 
infrastructure and effective incentive mechanisms. This paper addresses these particular 
silences in an Asian context. It examines a real-life situation where the company has 
implemented necessary incentive systems to promote knowledge sharing. Yet due to the 
various hidden agendas withheld by employees, the objectives of the knowledge management 
system might ultimately not be achieved. 
This study also raises broader questions about the social and political nature of the 
motivational forces behind knowledge sharing, such as the extent to which hidden agendas 
can inhibit, repress or constrain the participation of employees in knowledge sharing. 
Answering these questions can be very critical especially in Asia where individuals are less 
inclined to demonstrate or communicate their thoughts openly compared to their western 
counterparts. The existing studies mainly examine explicit motivation mechanisms, such as 
monetary rewards, which can be limited in facilitating knowledge sharing. On the other hand, 
organizational interventions designed to eliminate such hidden agendas could be deemed as 
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over-idealistic, as these agendas are deeply intertwined with the psychological and cultural 
mindsets of individuals. It is therefore recommended that further studies should look into 
ways in which such hidden agendas can be surfaced out, in order to reduce its negative 
impacts on knowledge sharing across organizations. 
We can conclude that knowledge sharing in the Asian business environment is a highly 
complex and dynamic process that can be driven or impeded by social or political actors. 
These actors are embedded deep within the mindsets of individuals and are influential in 
one’s motivation towards knowledge sharing. Some of them are seldom discussed or 
demonstrated openly, hence the term “hidden agendas”. It is highly unlikely that explicit 
motivation mechanisms designed to promote knowledge-sharing can overcome such hidden 
agendas. We urge the need to move towards recognizing these hidden agendas in order to 
reduce their impact on productive knowledge sharing. 
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Table 1. Fieldwork scheme 
No. Job Title  Organization Age Nationality Work 
Experience 
1 Product 
Development 
Manager 
Product 
Development 
Team 
35 Taiwanese Managerial – 6 
yrs 
Work – 12 yrs 
2 Senior 
Engineer 
Product 
Development 
Team 
38 Taiwanese Work – 15 yrs 
 
3 Senior 
Engineer 
Product 
Development 
Team 
32 Taiwanese Work – 9 yrs 
 
4 Production 
Line Manager 
Manufacturing 
Team 
34 PRC Managerial – 4 
yrs 
Work – 8 yrs 
5 Production 
Line 
Supervisor 
Manufacturing 
Team 
33 PRC Work – 12 yrs 
 
6 QA Engineer Manufacturing 
Team 
27 PRC Work – 5 yrs 
 
7 NPI Engineer Manufacturing 
Team 
26 PRC Work – 4 yrs 
 
8 Senior Process 
Engineer 
Manufacturing 
Team 
29 PRC Work – 8 yrs 
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Table 2. The four hidden agendas 
Hidden agenda The concerns in 
Taiwan office 
The concerns in 
Chinese office 
Why they do not 
share knowledge 
1. Fending off free 
riders 
The Taiwanese are 
wary of the Chinese' 
reputation of being 
free-riders who 
might claim credit 
for knowledge 
shared with them.  
The Chinese are 
fearful that their 
Taiwanese 
counterparts may 
perceive them as 
inferior in terms of 
knowledge.  
There is a high level 
of distrust between 
the two sides, which 
stems from 
misconstrued 
perceptions and 
generalism.  
2.Avoiding knowledge 
liability 
The Taiwanese are 
worried about the 
consequences of 
being blamed for any 
undesired 
consequences of 
sharing knowledge.  
 
The Chinese are less 
inclined towards 
seeking clarifications 
for fear of being 
perceived as not 
being intellectual 
equals to their 
Taiwanese 
counterparts.  
Past instances 
whereby a 
Taiwanese was 
being blamed for 
the mistakes of his 
Chinese 
counterparts 
reinforce the fear on 
both sides. 
3. Lacking absorptive 
capacity 
The Taiwanese 
perceive their 
Chinese counterparts 
as lacking absorptive 
capacity. 
 
The Chinese believe 
that their Taiwanese 
counterparts are 
arrogant and share 
knowledge without 
much focus on 
practicality. 
 
Both sides' sense of 
prejudice against 
each other, create a 
self-fulfilling 
prophecy, leading to 
further prevention 
of knowledge 
sharing.  
4. Engulfing social 
inequality 
The Taiwanese 
believes in 
segregating 
themselves from 
their Chinese 
counterparts to prove 
they are superior. 
The Chinese are 
upset by the explicit 
show of such social 
inequality but are 
resigned towards 
accepting it.  
 
Such social 
segregation forms a 
formidable barrier 
to knowledge 
sharing between 
both sides.  
 
 
